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next (npm) · published 2026-07-22

Next.js: Cache confusion of response bodies for requests with bodies containing invalid UTF-8 byte sequences

CVE-2026-64647 — CVSS 0/10. Fix: upgrade to 15.5.21.
Package
next
Ecosystem
npm

Impact

A server-side `fetch` with a request body may return a cached **response** body from a different request to the same URL but different body. Confidential data in the `POST`'s **response** body would then leak to unauthorized requests. Though the request itself will not be deduped.

This is only an issue when receiving request bodies with a content type charset other than UTF-8. For example, the UTF-16 byte sequences for `삃삃` and `섄섄` in the request body would share the same cache.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, consider only making fetch requests with UTF-8 bodies (default in Next.js). Applications using Pages Router are not vulnerable.

Weakness classes: CWE-116 (Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output)

Source: GHSA-4633-3j49-mh5q · GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0) — printed from a structured Sanity dataset. ← Back to the front page

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