undici vulnerable to cookie attribute injection via unsanitized domain and unparsed setCookie fields
Impact
The `setCookie` function has two attribute injection paths. `validateCookieDomain` does not reject semicolons (`validateCookiePath` already does at 0x3B), so a `domain` value like `example.com; SameSite=None` lands verbatim as `Domain=example.com; SameSite=None`. The `unparsed` array's loop only checks each entry contains `=` and does not sanitize values, so an entry like `X-Custom=val; HttpOnly` lands unchanged, injecting `HttpOnly` without the caller setting `cookie.httpOnly = true`.
Applications that pass user-controlled input to these fields, typically multi-tenant or reverse-proxy servers that scope session cookies to a tenant-supplied domain, can have SameSite CSRF protections bypassed, `Secure` or `HttpOnly` forced or stripped, or the intended SameSite tier overridden.
Patches
Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0.
Workarounds
- Sanitize `domain` values against the RFC 1034 letter-digit-hyphen set before passing to `setCookie`.
- Do not pass user-controlled data to the `unparsed` field.
Weakness classes: CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'))
Source: GHSA-v3r7-h72x-cjcm · GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0) — printed from a structured Sanity dataset. ← Back to the front page